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Corporate Personhood and the
Rights of Corporate Speech
Adam Winklert
My objective here is to provide a little historical background on
business corporations and their place in First Amendment law. In the
course of that overview, I will also make a few observations that I be-
lieve can be helpful in thinking about corporate speech rights. First, I will
argue that one aspect of the constitutional status of corporations-the
notion of corporate personhood-has not played the central role in shap-
ing corporate speech rights that some believe. Corporations have free
speech rights, but they are more limited than those held by individuals.
Second, I will argue that there is not a single right of corporate speech.
Rather, there are at least four distinct free speech rights held by corpora-
tions. Each one is subject to its own set of rules and restrictions, and
there are a number of inconsistencies in the reasoning of the relevant de-
cisions, breeding a set of doctrines with little coherence. I will conclude
with some thoughts on the effectiveness of limiting corporate speech in
an age of "loose" corporate law.
When the Founders established the principle of free speech in both
the Federal and state constitutions, corporate speech was far from their
minds. There were very few corporations at the founding, with estimates
of only about six corporations chartered in the U.S. at that time.'
Moreover, in the early decades of the U.S., the states exercised consider-
able control over corporations that made them unlikely holders of so-
called rights against the government. Corporations could only be formed
t Acting Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.
1. See Simeon E. Baldwin, American Business Corporations Before 1789, 8 AM. HIST. REV.
449, 450 (1903). Corporations grew rapidly in the immediate aftermath of the American Revolution,
with estimates of approximately 350 business corporations formed between 1783 and 1801. See
Oscar Handlin & Mary F. Handlin, Origin of the American Business Corporation, 5 J. ECON. HIST.
1,4(1945).
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by an affirmative grant by the legislature and were required to have a
"public purpose."2 As part of this process of state chartering, states
dictated corporate affairs with a fine eye for detail-setting the rates
companies could charge, providing for government inspection, and estab-
lishing firm limits on corporate powers.3
In the landmark decision of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,4 de-
cided in 1819, Chief Justice John Marshall emphasized that a corporation
was "an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in con-
templation of law." 5 But this decision also held that state power was not
unlimited. The charter given by the state to the corporation, Marshall
wrote, was a contract that the state was bound to respect. 6 The basis for
this ruling was a fundamental fact of the corporate form in the context of
constitutional law: corporations are formed by real individuals and those
individuals have constitutional rights against the state. 7 Corporations re-
ceive constitutional protection, as Dartmouth College did, in order to
protect the constitutional rights of the individuals behind the artificial
entity.
States easily maneuvered around the Dartmouth College decision
by adding to new corporate charters provisions permitting the states to
revise their bargains.8 Because incorporators agreed to this contractual
provision, they could not complain. Effectively, then, states were able to
continue to regulate corporate affairs with vigor. This continued even
after the adoption of "general" or "free" incorporation laws in the mid-
1800s, which broadened access to corporations, diminished the necessity
for an affirmative act of the legislature, and led to a wave of corporate
formation.9
In 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment was added to the Constitu-
tion. 10 Its most significant provision, Section 1, guarantees to all
2. "[A]t its origin... the corporation was conceived as an agency of the government, endowed
with public attributes, exclusive privileges, and political power, and designed to serve a social func-
tion of the state." Handlin & Handlin, supra note 1, at 22.
3. See David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 210. For illustration of
the detailed requirements of corporate charters, in this case New York turnpike companies, see
Daniel B. Klein & John Majewski, Economy, Community, and Law: The Turnpike Movement in New
York, 1797-1845, 26 LAW & SoC'y REv. 469,484-85 (1992).
4. 17 U.S. 518 (1819).
5. Id. at 636.
6. Id. at 643-44.
7. According to Marshall, "It is chiefly for the purpose of clothing bodies of men, in succes-
sion, with qualities and capacities, that corporations were invented, and are in use." Id. at 636.
8. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO.
L.J. 1593, 1616-17 (1988).
9. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970, at 9 (1970).
10. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV.
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"persons" due process of law and equal protection of the laws. Although
corporations were widespread and well known at this time," the Framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend to grant corporations these
rights.' 2 One member of the congressional committee that drafted the
Fourteenth Amendment however-Roscoe Conkling of New York-
argued to the Supreme Court on behalf of a railroad company that the
drafters silently intended to include corporations within the ambit of the
Amendment, 13 giving rise to what has been called the "conspiracy
theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 4 No independent evidence to
support his claim has ever been uncovered.'"
Nevertheless, in 1886, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in the
case of Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad16 that would
establish corporate personhood. Prior to oral argument, Chief Justice
Morrison Waite announced: "The court does not wish to hear argument
on the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to these corpora-
tions. We are all of the opinion that it does. ' ' 7 When the court reporter
included this statement at the beginning of the published opinion,' 8
corporate personhood was established-without argument, without justi-
fication, without explanation, and without dissent.
This doctrinal development coincided with the dawn of the giant
management corporations.' 9 Fed by a national economy, broader stock
11. See SCOTT R. BOWMAN, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL
THOUGHT: LAW, POWER AND IDEOLOGY 42 (1996).
12. See CHARLES FAIRMAN, 2 RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88, at 724 (1987) (con-
cluding that "the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not have corporations in view"); Ins. Co.
v. City of New Orleans, 13 F. CAS. 67, 68 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 7052) (rejecting 14th Amendment
personhood for corporations in light of the "history of the submission by Congress, and the adoption
by the states ... so fresh in all minds as to need no rehearsal").
13. See Charles A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 111-13
(rev. ed. 1937); FAIRMAN, supra note 12, at 725-28. Conkling's argument, which was made in San
Mateo v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 13 F. 722 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882), is reprinted in HOWARD JAY
GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION 606 (1968).
14. See BEARD & BEARD, supra note 13, at 111; Howard Jay Graham, The "Conspiracy The-
ory" of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 YALE L.J. 371 (1938); Howard Jay Graham, The "Conspir-
acy Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment: 2, 48 YALE L. J. 171 (1938) [hereinafter Graham, Con-
spiracy Part Two]; Andrew C. McLaughlin, The Court, The Corporation, and Conkling, 46 AM.
HIST. REV. 45 (1940).
15. See Graham, Conspiracy Part Two, supra note 14, at 384-85.
16. 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
17. Id. at 396.
18. See THOM HARTMANN, UNEQUAL PROTECTION: THE RISE OF CORPORATE DOMINANCE
AND THE THEFT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 107-08 (2002).
19. See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977).
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ownership separated from corporate control, and the liberalization of
corporate law to remove longstanding limits on corporate powers-such
as the doctrine of ultra vires-American business became organized
largely around the business corporation. 20 Less and less were corpora-
tions controlled by state corporate law; increasingly they were run by
professional, salaried managers. 21
According to some critics of Santa Clara, the decision placed busi-
ness corporations on par with natural individuals, with each entitled to
the same rights under the Constitution.22 But equivalent rights for corpo-
rations did not follow from Santa Clara and, indeed, in subsequent years
the Supreme Court allowed the states to cabin the rights of corporations
in ways not possible in the context of individuals. For example, in the
Lochner era, when the Supreme Court held that individuals enjoyed a
liberty of contract that prevented states from interfering with private
business relationships, the courts upheld state laws limiting corporations'
contractual rights.23 Although recognizing corporate rights under the
Fourth Amendment, the Court also held that, unlike individuals, corpora-
tions do not have a Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.24
In the realm of freedom of speech, corporate rights have never been
equivalent to those of individuals. In the early 1900s, Congress and the
majority of state legislatures adopted laws completely barring
corporations from contributing money to candidates for public office. 25
These laws remain in effect, even though individuals cannot be subjected
to such a ban. In the 1930s and 1940s, the Supreme Court first began to
offer judicial protection for the constitutional guarantee of free speech
20. See Adam Winkler, "'Other People's Money ": Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign
Finance Law, 92 GEO. L.J. 871, 907-08 (2004); Hovenkamp, supra note 8, at 1659-64.
21. See William Bratton, The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives From
History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1487-88 (1989).
22. See HARTMANN, supra note 18, at 5-6. This view is especially prevalent in the anti-
corporate activist community. See, e.g., William Meyers, The Santa Clara Blues: Corporate Person-
hood Versus Democracy, http://www.mcn.org/e/iii/afd/santaclara.html (last visited November 15,
2006); Richard L. Grossman & Frank T. Adams, Taking Care ofBusiness: Citizenship and the Char-
ter of Incorporation (1993), http://www.ratical.org/corporations/TCoB.html (last visited November
15, 2006); Joel Bleifuss, Know Thine Enemy, IN THESE TIMES, Feb. 8, 1998. For dissenting views,
see Hovenkamp, supra note 8, at 1643 (arguing that Santa Clara was based on practical convenience
of naming corporations, rather than their shareholders, in litigation); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 67 (1992)
(arguing that Santa Clara was not meant to express a pro-big business theory of the corporation).
23. See, e.g., Nw. Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243 (1906). See also Hovenkamp,
supra note 8, at 1646 (arguing that corporate rights of contract in the Lochner era were not equiva-
lent to those of natural individuals).
24. See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
25. See Winkler, supra note 20, at 926.
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for individuals.26 At this same time, broad restrictions on corporate
speech were enacted in the form of the federal and state securities laws.
These laws imposed strict limits on a variety of corporate speech relating
27to their businesses in the name of protecting investors.
In the 1970s, the Supreme Court held that corporations have some
free speech rights in Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission28
(commercial speech) and First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti29 (po-
litical speech). Yet, contrary to the criticisms of corporate personhood,
corporate speech rights are still not equivalent to individual speech
rights. For example, corporations are still barred from using their general
treasury funds to support candidates for office.30 Instead, business corpo-
rations have to raise this money through voluntary contributions to sepa-
rate, segregated accounts. Individuals, of course, cannot be barred from
using their "general treasury accounts" to finance political contributions
and required to use segregated funds.3'
Moreover, to the extent the Court has recognized First Amendment
rights of corporations, corporate personhood was not central to those de-
cisions. The Court was more inclined to rest the argument for corporate
speech on the right of listeners, for whom the underlying information
would be useful.32 Bellotti was clear that asking if corporations had First
Amendment rights was "the wrong question., 33 Indeed, the Bellotti deci-
sion stated that the corporate identity of the speaker was irrelevant.34
None of the major corporate speech decisions rely on the Santa Clara
decision.
Thus, corporate personhood has played a smaller role in crafting
corporate constitutional rights than many believe. In addition, corporate
constitutional rights, including the freedom of speech, are not equivalent
to the rights enjoyed by natural persons.
26. See Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297
U.S. 233 (1936); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
27. See HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE CORPORATION AND THE CONSTITUTION
93-106 (1995) (arguing that provisions of federal securities law are unconstitutional abridgements of
speech).
28. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
29. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
30. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2000).
31. See Adam Winkler, McConnell v. FEC, Corporate Political Speech, and the Legacy of the
Segregated Fund Cases, 3 ELECT. L.J. 361 (2004).
32. See, e.g., Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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II.
Although not equivalent to the speech rights of individuals, corpo-
rate speech rights do exist. Indeed, there are numerous distinct, identifi-
able speech rights enjoyed by corporations. 35 There are at least four
different corporate speech rights, and potentially five. Each one is subject
to different doctrinal requirements and legislative burdens. And there is a
considerable degree of inconsistency in the reasoning and
rationales behind them.
First, there is the right of commercial speech. Under Central Hud-
son Gas, Virginia State Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council,36 and related decisions, corporations have the right to propose
commercial transactions and to advertise their goods and services. As I
mentioned, the Court did not rely on corporate personhood to protect this
speech right but relied instead on the right of consumers to the informa-
tion.37 The identity of the speaker was more or less ignored. Moreover,
the corporate right of commercial speech can be limited. Courts apply a
form of intermediate scrutiny to burdensome laws,38 and states may regu-
late the content of commercial speech to insure it contains truthful in-
formation-something states cannot do with regard to political speech.39
The second corporate free speech right pertains to electoral speech
concerning ballot measures. Here, Bellotti, where the Court held uncon-
stitutional a Massachusetts law barring corporations from spending
money to influence ballot measure campaigns, 40 applies. Under Bellotti,
laws burdening this type of corporate political speech are subject to a
higher standard than commercial speech: strict scrutiny. 41 Although Bel-
lotti announced that the corporate identity of the speaker was not a rele-
vant consideration under the First Amendment, Justice Lewis Powell's
majority opinion was not totally blind to corporate organizational dy-
namics. For example, Powell did consider whether the ban on ballot
measure speech was justified by the state's interest in protecting dissent-
ing shareholders from supporting corporate political expenditures chosen
35. There are ample reasons why we might decide not to accord business corporations First
Amendment speech rights. By law, corporations are not free to choose any perspective; rather they
must pursue business purposes. Moreover, the legal commitment of management to shareholders
envisions unidimensional, exclusively profit-oriented shareholders. See Daniel J.H. Greenwood,
Essential Speech: Why Corporate Speech is Not Free, 83 IOWA L. REV. 995 (1998).
36. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
37. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Servs. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 567-68
(1980).
38. See id at 564-65.
39. See, e.g., id. at 563-64.
40. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978).
41. See id at 786-89.
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by management. But Powell bought into the traditional corporate law
argument as to why regulation to protect shareholders is unnecessary:"shareholders normally are presumed competent to protect their own in-
terests," he wrote, citing to the "procedures of corporate democracy" and
derivative suits against management.42
Since being handed down in 1978, Bellotti has been the starting
point for discussion of corporate political speech rights. Yet it is easy to
exaggerate the importance of Bellotti. There is another line of Supreme
Court cases on corporations' ability to speak about electoral matters, one
which allows a considerable amount of regulation of corporate speech. In
an often-overlooked series of early Supreme Court campaign finance
cases decided between 1948 and 1972 43-what I call the Segregated
Fund Cases4 4-the Court held that corporations and unions could be re-
quired to finance candidate-related speech through separate, segregated
funds rather than through general treasury funds. Although any law bar-
ring corporations and unions from collecting voluntary contributions
from members to use in electoral politics would raise the "gravest doubt
... as to its constitutionality, '45 the state could protect dissenting finan-
cial supporters from being forced to fund political speech. These cases
establish the third corporate speech right: a right to candidate-related
speech, which may be subject to special financing rules designed to pro-
tect dissenting members. In contrast to Bellotti and the commercial
speech decisions, the cases coming out of this third corporate speech
right are all about protecting shareholders and employees. Corporate
form here is key to shaping the constitutional right.
In numerous cases decided after Bellotti, the Court has made clear
that the segregated fund framework survived that landmark decision. In-
deed, in each subsequent case Bellotti was not treated as a landmark but
relegated to a footnote, distinguished away and limited to its particular
facts. In FEC v. National Right to Work Committee, the Court upheld a
federal campaign finance law that restricted corporations and unions
from soliciting money from anyone but their members for their segre-
gated funds.4 6 According to the Court, "the special characteristics of the
corporate structure require careful regulation," and it was appropriate to
"treat[] unions, corporations, and similar organizations differently from
42. See id. at 794-95.
43. Pipefitters v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972); United States v. Autoworkers, 352 U.S.
567 (1957); United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
44. See Winkler, supra note 31, at 361 (analyzing the influence of the segregated fund frame-
work in contemporary campaign finance law).
45. CIO, 335 U.S. at 121.
46. 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
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individuals. ''47 In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, decided in
1990, the Court upheld a state bar on corporations using general treasury
funds to finance independent advocacy in favor of candidates.48 The law
required corporations to finance such expenditures through voluntarily
raised, segregated funds. The state was entitled to adopt these restrictions
to prevent corporations from using the "state-conferred" benefits of the
corporate form, which enables them to raise money for economic pur-
poses, "to obtain an unfair advantage in the political marketplace. 49
Implicit in the reasoning of the Court was a concern for protecting dis-
senting shareholders.50 In FEC v. Beaumont, decided in 2003, the Court
once again stated that it was constitutionally permissible to require busi-
ness corporations to use segregated funds for candidate-related speech.51
And in McConnell v. FEC, which upheld most provisions of the McCain-
Feingold campaign reform law, the Court held that the "ability to form
and administer separate segregated funds ... has provided corporations
and unions with a constitutionally sufficient opportunity to engage in
express [political] advocacy. That has been this Court's unanimous
view .... 52
Bellotti, then, is of potentially limited significance when it comes to
corporate political speech rights. It is worth emphasizing that the law
involved in that case was very broad and did not allow corporations to
establish separate, segregated funds to finance ballot measure speech.
Moreover, the strict scrutiny standard established in Bellotti has not
proven fatal to laws with segregated fund options; the corporate speech
restrictions in Austin and McConnell are notable examples of that sup-
posedly rare breed-strict scrutiny survivors. This raises the unanswered
question of whether even corporate speech related to ballot measures can
be restricted to speech financed through separate, segregated funds.
Finally, there is a fourth (and possibly even a fifth) corporate
speech right. The fourth right is the right to non-election-related political
speech--or, alternatively phrased, speech about general matters of public
concern. The Supreme Court first addressed this type of law in Consoli-
dated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission, which involved a regu-
lation barring public utilities from including in monthly bills inserts dis-
cussing controversial issues of public policy. 53 The Court invalidated the
47. Id. at 209-10.
48. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
49. Id. at 659-60 (internal quotations omitted).
50. See Adam Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 133 (1998) (showing how con-
cerns for protecting shareholders underlie Austin).
51. 539 U.S. 146 (2003).
52. 540 U.S. 93, 203 (2003).
53. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
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law under strict scrutiny.54 Here, unlike in the Segregated Funds Cases,
the corporate identity of the speaker was ignored; the Court offered no
discussion of how the particular organizational dynamics of the utility
affected the underlying right.
The interesting question is whether corporate speech on general
matters of public concern can be limited in other ways. This was the is-
sue raised by the recent case of Nike v. Kasky, which involved a suit
against the shoemaker for taking out allegedly misleading advertisements
defending its labor policies in overseas factories.55 The Supreme Court
appeared poised to strike down the California law but abruptly dismissed
the case without reaching the merits. Invalidation of the law would have
been in line with established First Amendment doctrine on speech related
to matters of public concern, where Oliver Wendell Holmes' notion that
the marketplace (not the government) is the arbiter of truth has long been
the norm.
But such a decision might well have called into question aspects of
the securities laws. If a corporation has a First Amendment right to make
uninhibited public announcements, a number of important provisions
would be called into question. These include the current rules regulating
prospectuses-such as the mandatory silent period imposed on new issu-
ers of securities56-and the proxy solicitation rules, which compel corpo-
rations to include unwanted speech in communications to shareholders. 57
One might respond that the securities laws cover commercial
speech, which is subject to more regulation than political speech. But
commercial speech doctrine allows government to restrict false or mis-
leading speech, while the securities laws apply even to completely truth-
ful speech. Communications to potential investors and proxy solicitations
are burdened regardless of their truth. The same can be said for Regula-
tion FD-which requires corporations to disclose information to the
market as a whole rather than to selective, most favored recipients.58 The
Supreme Court would not likely want to undermine over seventy years of
federal securities laws. Recognizing a broad right of corporations to
speak about matters of public concern might have that unfortunate effect.
Should a case like Nike v. Kasky be decided anytime soon, the
Court may well craft a fifth corporate free speech right: a new set of rules
to oversee regulation of corporations to preserve the integrity of the capi-
tal markets. Under this speech right, corporations can be sharply
54. Id. at 541 et seq.
55. 539 U.S. 654 (2003).
56. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2006).
57. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2006).
58. See id. § 243.100.
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restricted in the name of protecting actual and potential investors. Here it
will be hard for the courts to ignore corporate organizational dynamics,
as protection of one group of corporate members (shareholders) from the
potential misconduct of another group (managers) is the whole purpose
of the regulation.
III.
Finally, let me offer a sobering observation about the effectiveness
of restrictions on corporations' First Amendment rights. Even if the
courts were to permit the banning of corporate political speech entirely,
corporate influence and power would not be substantially reduced. Con-
sider, for example, what happened in the wake of the Tillman Act of
1907, the federal law that banned corporations from contributing general
treasury funds to candidates. Did corporate interests cease to exercise
undue control over electoral politics? Hardly. Instead, the executives and
financiers of corporations redoubled their own efforts to influence politi-
cians to favor corporate interests, using their own money. 59 That such
money was made up for by increased salary taken from the corporate till
was predictable.
The same phenomenon will occur with any broad restriction on
corporate political speech. The executives and bankers behind the major
corporations in America are the richest class of citizens outside of Major
League Baseball All-Stars and Oprah Winfrey. The problem, in a nut-
shell, is corporate law. This body of "regulation"-and I use that term
loosely--does almost nothing to limit the use of company funds by cor-
porate executives. Fiduciary duties of care and loyalty are not offended
by salaries and compensation packages that offend every other sensibil-
ity.60 The capital markets are no solution either. Although contractarian
scholars have for the last three decades touted the ability of efficient
capital markets to discipline corporate management,6' the markets have
shown that even remarkably excessive forms of self-dealing evade pun-
ishment. The result is that if we restrict the political speech of Nike, you
can be sure that Phil Knight, the company's founder and board
Chairman, will finance the same ads and pursue the same political
power. And he will do it with money he takes from the corporation
through compensation or stock.
59. See JAMES K. POLLOCK, JR., PARTY CAMPAIGN FUNDS 127-28 (1926).
60. Cf In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (holding that $130
million severance package for executive fired shortly after hiring did not breach fiduciary duties).
61. See Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract,
85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985) (detailing and criticizing the contractarian argument).
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Even if the fictional entity as such did not have constitutional
rights, such as free speech, the actual persons behind the corporation-as
John Marshall recognized almost 200 years ago-will continue to have
them. In light of current corporate law, corporate executives will find a
way to exercise those rights with the help of other people's money.
